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While the judgment in C-619/18 Commission v. Poland is unlikely to deliver a
surprise as to the assessment of the Polish ‘reforms’, interesting issues are
emerging in relation to the effects of the judgment for the Polish authorities. This
piece starts from a brief discussion why the case seems lost for Poland, proceeding
then to analysis whether and how the judgment should be implemented.
1. Seeking the logic of the reform of the judges'
retirement system
The question of the ‘reform’ of the Polish Supreme Court which is to be decided
by the ECJ does not, at first glance, give rise to doubt. The basic problem – the
lowering of the retirement age of active judges – is politically sensitive though
legally quite straightforward. The Polish Act on the Supreme Court infringed the
principle of the irremovability of judges as it shortened the previously prescribed
period of exercise by them of their office without a material justification and without
a transitional period, depriving 27 judges out of 72 Supreme Court judges their
office. However, this change should be seen in a broader context: at the same
time the composition of the Supreme Court was increased (to as many as 120
judges) and the manner in which they are appointed was changed by interrupting the
term of office of the existing National Judicial Council which stands guard over the
independence of judges and elects them. At present, 23 out of 25 members of the
National Judicial Council are appointed by the governing majority.
The Act on the Supreme Court, being under verification by the ECJ, grants the
Polish President a discretional power to extend the service of a judge on the
Supreme Court after she or he reaches the retirement age. This may be done twice,
each time for three years, and gives rise to further doubts as to the independence
of the Supreme Court. In essence, such regulation makes the possibility of the
exercise of judicial powers dependent upon the permission of the executive branch.
This exposes judges to the temptation – when faced with retirement – to rule in
accordance with the expectations of the President and thus increase their chance of
their term of service being extended.
Looking at the entirety of these changes, it is difficult to see any logic in them. Since
there is a need to increase the composition of the Supreme Court to 120 judges,
then why retire almost 30 of them? In particular those judges who have the most
experience and institutional memory? If the proper retirement age should be 65, why
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allowing two 3-year extensions of the service? It follows from this that the legislator
believes that a Supreme Court judge can easily work until 71 years of age, i.e. in
principle just like before the ‘reform’. Why is it that, after the changes, the judge must
obtain the consent of the President, when earlier this was not necessary? Why is the
President not obligated to act on the basis of objective criteria (e.g. state of health)?
The legislator has not given a convincing answer to these questions.
For these reasons one may predict that – just like the Advocate General – the Court
of Justice will reach the conclusion that the ‘reform’ of the Supreme Court infringes
EU law.
2. Has the potential judgment stating an
infringement been already carried out?
More interesting than the outcome of the case itself seems to be the implementation
of the possible judgment declaring an infringement. To discuss this implementation,
one must go back in time to 19 October 2018. This day the Vice President of the
Court granted the Commission’s interim measures against Poland (ultimately the
Court granted the Commission interim measures on 17 December). The order of
the Vice President obligated Poland, amongst others, to immediately suspend the
provisions of the Act concerning forced retirement, suspend the measures adopted
in order to apply these provisions, as well as “to take all necessary steps to ensure”
that judges could perform their earlier functions in exactly the same way as before
the reform.
Initially the Polish government and parliament acted passively, while the Supreme
Court and Supreme Administrative Court themselves admitted the removed judges
back to service on the basis of the interim order itself. This gave rise to objections
on the part of politicians of Prawo i Sprawiedliwo##, who stated that this order is
not directly effective and must be yet executed by the legislative powers. Facing
a fait accompli – admission of judges to once again hand down judgments – 
the Parliament adopted the Act of 21 November 2018 (Reinstatement Law). The
Reinstatement Law, on the one hand, set aside the provisions challenged by the
Commission, while on the other it reversed the effects of their application.
But who was right: the high courts, stating that the provisional interim measures were
directly effective, or the government – stating that performance of them required a
statute? In this context, it is key to establish who specifically was to carry out these
measures. In our view, this issue lies with the national law as part of its institutional
and procedural autonomy as an interim decision is addressed to a Member State,
and not to a specific authority in that State. As a result, one should deem permissible
both the implementation of the order of the Vice President by the Supreme Court
and the Supreme Administrative Court which simply admitted the judges to service,
and the implementation by the Polish parliament which for this purpose adopted the
Reinstatement Law.
After the forthcoming CJEU’s decision in this matter, the question arises, whether
Poland will still have to put the judgement into effect or whether – as the Polish
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government claims – the judgment has already been implemented. Article 2 sec.
1 of the Reinstatement Law reinstated judges of the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Administrative Court who had been retired by virtue of the Act reforming
the Supreme Court. The Act deemed their service to have not been interrupted,
while those judges who were not interested in returning to active service had the
possibility of submitting a declaration to the President. In the same way, Article
2(4) of the Reinstatement Law reinstated presidents of the Supreme Court to their
positions. Thus, the Law assumes that the Supreme Court judges effectively retired
on the basis of the Law and were then reinstated.
This does not, however, mean that the Reinstatement Law constituted at the same
time a correct implementation of a possible judgment of the ECJ declaring an
infringement of Article 19(1) TEU. Such a judgment has a declarative character and
in this essentially differs from interim measures, imposing on Poland obligations
to engage in specific actions. Such a judgment will merely state if a national law
stands in conflict with EU law (independent of it) . If the Act on the Supreme Court
infringes EU law, the Reinstatement Law, the principle of primacy applies, since
Article 19 (1) TEU is an directly effective provision. Hence the elements of the Act on
the Supreme Court contrary to EU law cannot be applied by virtue of law. Therefore
removing effects of their application is unnecessary. The ECJ states unequivocally
that provisions of EU law have effect “in their relations with the internal law of the
Member States, merely by entering into force, of rendering automatically inapplicable
any conflicting provision of national law”. It is so as the provisions of EU law “must
deploy their full effects, in a uniform manner in all Member States, as from their entry
into force and throughout the duration of their validity” (Winner Wetten, points 53-54).
Essentially, this means that there will be a contradiction between the Reinstatement
Law and a possible judgment of the ECJ declaring an infringement of EU law since
the content of the Polish Act on the Supreme Court – as contrary to EU law – could
not have been applied, the judges did not retire on that basis. Since they did not
retire, they could not be reinstated to service. The Reinstatement Law is thus in this
part at least legally ineffective.
It could thus seem that the proper route for the Polish legislative to take, in the
event that Poland loses the proceedings before the ECJ, is to set aside parts of the
Reinstatement Law and accept that the high court judges continue their tenure by
virtue of EU law itself. However, such an approach appears excessively formalistic.
The Law, in this scope, has already had its effects in the period before the issuing of
the judgment and after the issuing by the ECJ of the interim measures which justified
its issuance. Of course, in this period also the Act on the Supreme Court could not
be applied by virtue of the principle of primacy – it remained however the subject of
a dispute between the Polish government and the Commission, while adoption of the
Reinstatement Law allowed for an actual securing of the resolution of that dispute by
the ECJ.
To sum up, we believe that in reality the judges of the Supreme Court, and of the
Supreme Administrative Court, who did not express such a will, did not retire, the
Reinstatement Law could not therefore reinstate them to service and was in this
regard legally ineffective. It had however factual effects, and the fact itself that they
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have reached their full realization (the reinstatement was a one-off event) means that
there is no need to abrogate its provisions.
On the other hand, we do not agree with the arguments of Poland that the judgment
became irrelevant and without purpose. There is no need to repeat here the
argumentation raised in the opinion of the Attorney General and the blogs.
In any event, on the day the CJEU’s implementation deadline lapsed, Poland did not
remove the infringement, and the removal of the infringement in execution of interim
measures does not guarantee that it will be a permanent removal. The practice of
law-making in Poland under the Prawo i Sprawiedliwo## government shows that
even acts concerning the most elementary institutions of the state may be adopted
in a couple of days or at night, as evinced by acts on the Constitutional Tribunal or a
recent reform of the Criminal Code regarding paedophilia.
The views expressed in this text are the personal views of the authors and cannot be
ascribed to the institutions in which they work.
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